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t has been one and a half years since the emergence of the 2009
novel pandemic H1N1 inﬂuenza virus (pH1N1), which caused a
global pandemic in 2009-2010 (1). As we approach the 2010-2011
inﬂuenza season in the Northern Hemisphere, it is reasonable to
speculate as to what role this virus will have in the upcoming inﬂu-
enza season in the United States. The pH1N1 virus is still circulating
throughout the world, albeit at much lower levels than during the
2009-2010 inﬂuenza season (2), and it is extremely likely that infec-
tions with pH1N1 will occur in the United States during the 2010-
2011inﬂuenzaseason.Theimpactofthisvirusduringtheupcoming
inﬂuenzaseasonwilldependdirectlyonthedegreeofexistingimmu-
nity in the population, i.e., population immunity, provided that no
signiﬁcant antigenic change of the virus occurs.
Population immunity against pH1N1 in 2010-2011 will com-
prise a combination of factors, including the immunity raised by
prior exposures to cross-reacting viruses and vaccines, the extent
of infection with pH1N1, and the relative proportion of the pop-
ulation vaccinated against the virus in 2009-2010. Potential eva-
siveresponsesofavirustopopulationimmunityincludeantigenic
drift (sequential antigenic changes in hemagglutinin [HA] that
lead to immune escape), antigenic shift (importation by reassort-
ment of a gene encoding a different HA subtype with or without
additional viral genes), and intrasubtypic reassortment (ISR; im-
portationbyreassortmentofageneencodinganantigenicvariant
of the same HA subtype with or without other genes [3, 4]).






to some combination of prior exposures to related viruses and
vaccines. These exposures include infection by descendants of
pH1N1’sancestral1918pandemicH1N1virus(5),vaccinationin
the 1958-to-1967 era with human polyvalent vaccines containing
both seasonal and swine H1N1 antigens (6), vaccination with a
closely related 1976 swine inﬂuenza vaccine (7), and cross-
immunity elicited by more-recent but less closely related seasonal
viruses and vaccines (5, 7, 8). Because both higher antibody levels
and higher age-speciﬁc frequencies of antibody against pH1N1
were more strongly associated with exposures to pre-1957 H1N1
viruses, protection appeared to be concentrated in persons older
than ~55 years (alive during the 1918-to-1957 H1N1 era [5, 9]).
One and a half years after the appearance of pH1N1, popula-
tion immunity in 2010 is substantially higher than it was prior to
the emergence of the pandemic virus (Fig. 1) (5, 8–11), and this
immunityislikelytorisesubstantiallywithadministrationofvac-
cinesinthe2010-2011inﬂuenzaseason(10,11).Inadditiontothe
~19% of the U.S. population of ~310 million with preexisting
immunity (around 60 million persons) (http://www.census.gov
/population/www/projections/summarytables.html), there are
another ~62 million persons who have been immunized (20%,
representingthoseamongtheconservativelyestimated72million
vaccinated persons who were not already immune) and an addi-
tional61millionpersons(20%)whowerenaturallyinfected,sug-
gesting a current population immunity of ~59% in the United
States. Given the relatively low number of infections estimated so
far for persons older than 50 years (Fig. 1) and the possibility that
standardmeasurementsmayunderestimateimmunity,theremay
be a higher degree of population protection than predicted.
In this regard, we do not know the extent to which preexisting
cross-reactive antibodies can prevent infection or disease. It is
noteworthy that in past pandemics (e.g., the 1957-1958 pan-
demic),signiﬁcantnumbersofpersonswithprobablepriorexpo-
sures but without detectable cross-reactive antibodies seem nev-
ertheless to have been protected (12), as were some people with
low-levelcross-reactiveantibodiesagainstdistantlyrelatedviruses
(6). If the 1976 vaccine is protective without contributing high-
levelneutralizingantibodies,asmanyasanadditional8.3%ofthe
population might be partially or fully protected by it, even
30 years later (7). Moreover, immunity to neuraminidase (NA)
and conserved T cell epitopes (13), as well as anamnestic (boost-
ing) and “original antigenic sin” immune responses (14, 15),
might provide additional protection from infection or severe dis-
ease. Clearly, a large percentage of the U.S. population must al-
readybeimmunetopH1N1,reducingopportunitiesforexplosive
pandemic spread in the future.
In the face of such high levels of immunity so soon after emer-
gence of the pandemic virus, what options for continued circulation
does pH1N1 have? While pandemic and seasonal inﬂuenza viruses
have frequently surprised us, we should at least look at their past
behavior for guidance. In the past 120 years, pandemic inﬂuenza vi-
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following four mechanisms: (i) explosive recurrences and “waves”
(16) in (apparently) completely naïve (e.g., 1889) or partially im-
mune (e.g., 1918) populations, (ii) generation of novel pandemic
virusesbyantigenicshift(e.g.,descendantsofthe1918H1N1virusin
thepandemicsof1957and1968[17]),(iii)seasonalviralevolutionby
intrasubtypic reassortment (ISR; e.g., 1918 viral descendants in 1947
and 1951 [18], a 1957 H2N2 descendant in 1967 [19], and 1968
H3N2 descendants in 1997 and 2003 [3, 4]), and (iv) continuing
long-term seasonal circulation by antigenic drift (20).
Regardingtheﬁrstofthesepossibilities,i.e.,earlyexplosiverecur-
rences, it is noteworthy that population immunity to pH1N1 has
probably already surpassed what past pandemic viruses have nor-
mallyachievedintheirﬁrstyear(12,21,22).Moreover,inthelastsix
pandemics (going back 163 years), explosive recurrences generally
have not been observed or occurred at most on only one occasion
within the ﬁrst few years. The chief exceptions were the 1889 pan-
demic, when an as-yet-unidentiﬁed virus apparently struck a com-
pletely susceptible population and had one to four mostly seasonal
recurrences,andthe1918pandemic,inwhichonetothree“waves”of
mortality were seen in different locations, possibly because of sea-
sonaltiming(16).ExplosiverecurrencesofpH1N1maythereforebe
unlikely because of high and increasing population immunity.
The second possibility is an additional antigenic shift, as oc-
curred in 1957 and 1968, after antigenic drift over lengthy time
periods (39 and 11 years, respectively). Because the U.S. popula-









dictable consequences. However, it is noteworthy that succes-
sively decreasing severity has been associated with each antigenic
shift since 1918 for reasons that are not yet fully understood (24–
32) (http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/index.html). pH1N1 could po-
tentiallyreassortwithseasonalH3N2orH1N1viruses.Moreover,
reassortmentwithcocirculatingseasonalH1N1couldconceivably
result in the creation of an oseltamivir-resistant pH1N1 lineage
(33), which would complicate treatment and prophylaxis of at-
risk patients. Likewise, infection of swine with pH1N1 and addi-
tional reassortment with other currently circulating swine inﬂu-
enza viruses have already been identiﬁed (34), potentially leading
to novel viruses that could infect humans.
Similarly, ISR, which can be thought of as a “minor shift,”
cannot be ruled out as a possible means of pH1N1 survival. Had
this type of genetic change occurred in the previrology era, it
might not have left a recognizable epidemiological signature, as
some presumed antigenic shifts did. However, it seems likely that
in the past 92 years, ISR, as a mechanism for generating widely
circulating viruses with either antigenically variant HAs or other
gene constellations that confer enhanced viral ﬁtness, has been
selected for on only ﬁve occasions, and only after relatively long
periods of antigenic drift (28, 33, 10, 29, and 35 years [1]). Curi-
ously, ISRs have clustered at 4- to 6-year intervals for both H1N1
andH3N2viruses,in1947to1951and1997to2003,respectively;
this is an unexplained and possibly nonrandom occurrence. As
with known past antigenic shifts and ISRs, high population im-
munitytocirculatingH1N1virusesandvaccineswouldverylikely
afford partial protection if pH1N1 ISR occurred.
Regardingtheﬁnalpossibleknownmechanism,antigenicdrift,it
is worth noting that the ability to drift perpetually to escape evolving
population immunity may not be a property shared to the same de-
gree by all human inﬂuenza viruses (Fig. 2) (8, 24–32, 35) (http:
//www.cdc.gov/mmwr/index.html). The H3N2 virus has been drift-
ing signiﬁcantly more rapidly than either of its H1N1 and H2N2
ancestors,intheprocesscausingrecurringmortalitypeaks(8,24–32,
35) (http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/index.html). In fact, H3N2 viruses
havecausedlocalizedoutbreaksinJune-July2010intheUnitedStates




small nonrandom samples and on preliminary public health ﬁgures. Calculations assume that a proportional segment of the vaccinated population was already
naturally immune to pH1N1 and that infections occurred only in persons who were both nonimmune in early 2009 and not vaccinated before being infected.
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point how pH1N1 evolution will affect the circulation of H3N2 and
H1N1 viruses and vice versa.
Wehavelittleinformationconcerningthedeterminantsofthe
capacityforantigenicdrift.Wedonotknowwhetherthiscapacity
is inherent in all inﬂuenza viruses or a chance property of the
founding viral HA such as mutational repertoire or the ability to
add HA glycosylation to achieve antigenic masking. Nor is it
known how likely reassortment with antigenic shift is for viruses
inherently unable, or no longer able, to escape immunity via suc-




gence of the 1957 H2N2 virus 20 years earlier (Fig. 2) (17). We do
not understand how, after initially infecting only individuals un-
der20yearsofage,itcontinuedtocirculatewithminimaldriftup
to the present (33 years) in a population with high/growing im-
FIG2 Drift/ISRhistoryoffourpandemicinﬂuenzaviruses(A)andannualratesofall-causeexcessmortalityper100,000persons(B)intheUnitedStatesfrom
1957 to 2010 (24–32, 35) (http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/index.html). On the upper panel, drift/ISR are indicated by signiﬁcant antigenic change detected by
virologic and serologic means (1957 to 1967) (24) or by vaccine composition data from the World Health Organization (8) and the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/index.html). Data in panel A are based on modiﬁcations of data from the World Health Organization (8). Red,
H2N2;blue,H3N2;yellow,seasonalH1N1;purple,pH1N1.ISRsinpanelAareindicatedbyverticalhatching.Thedatasuggestthatthe1968H3N2virushasbeen
evolving rapidly (2 ISR and 22 drift changes of major signiﬁcance in 43 years; mean, 0.56 changes per year), while seasonal H1N1 (9 drift changes in 34 years;
mean, 0.27 changes per year) and H2N2 (1 ISR and 2 drift changes in 11 years; mean, 0.27 changes per year) have evolved signiﬁcantly more slowly. Because of
the unavailability of all-cause excess mortality data for 2005-2006 and 2006-2007, estimates of annual inﬂuenza-associated deaths with underlying respiratory
and circulatory causes are displayed for the years marked with an asterisk (35). For discussion of the various types of estimates of excess inﬂuenza mortality, see
Thompson et al. (31). †, data unavailable.
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immunityhasbeenassociatedwithrapidseasonalH3N2drift,but
withonlyslowseasonalH1N1drift,andwhysuchconditionshave
not resulted in H1N1 extinction. Other factors to be addressed
include the potential impact of various global infection and vac-
cination experiences on the evolution of pH1N1. In this regard,
most of the global population has far lower rates of pH1N1 and
seasonalinﬂuenzavaccinationandinﬂuenzaviruscirculationpat-
ternsdifferglobally(4).Clearly,profoundmysteriesabouthuman
inﬂuenza viral evolution remain. These issues are of practical im-
portance because viruses with reduced ability to drift, or even the
establishment of new pandemic viruses, might potentially be
eliminated by the development of herd immunity following con-
tinued high levels of vaccination (37).
In summary, history suggests that pH1N1 likely faces extinc-
tion unless it mutates, either by mechanisms (such as antigenic
shift or ISR) that have never been documented to occur in early
pandemic years or by successful antigenic drift, whether slow (as
with seasonal H1N1) or aggressive (as with H3N2). Apart from
population immunity, the factors driving pH1N1 evolution, such
as the inherent evolutionary properties of the founding viral HA,
NA,andotherviralgenes(forareview,seereference38)aswellas
competition with seasonal H1N1, are poorly understood.
Past history and current understanding suggest cautious opti-
mism that pH1N1 will eventually adapt to stable circulation via ge-
neticchangesresultingincontinuingmoderateorlowmortalityrates
orpossiblyevendisappearentirely.Nevertheless,itisnoteworthythat
other postpandemic viruses have continued to cause various rates of
excess mortality among younger persons for years after pandemic
appearance (39). The ﬁrst year of pH1N1 circulation has given us
important information that allows us to plan for the immediate fu-
ture.Untilsuchtimeasamajorantigenicchangeoccurs,thepopula-
tion over ~50 years old should remain substantially protected with
standard annual inﬂuenza vaccination and optimal existing public
healthandmedicalpractice.Thebulkofthestill-susceptiblepopula-
tion proportionally spans the under-50 age group (Fig. 1). Thus, in-
fantsolderthan6monthsofage,children,teenagers,andyoungand
middle-aged adults (the population disproportionately affected by
thepandemicin2009)willbeaggressivelytargetedforinﬂuenzavac-
cination (40) for the sake of individual protection as well as for con-
tributiontothedevelopmentofherdimmunityanddecreasedspread
to susceptible individuals (37).
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